Overview of the research activity

Study the incentives of economic agents to form groups and the organization of these interest groups in environments where (1) there is competition among groups to capture rents and (2) the members of the groups are not heterogeneous. In particular, our goal is to explain the formation of a group versus individual decision making, the characteristics or variables that have an impact on the success of groups (heterogeneity, size, etc.) and, therefore, on how do groups take internal decisions in order to affect this performance. We address these issues using two different channels of political influence: one in which the interest groups affect directly the behavior of policymakers; and in a second framework where policies are affected indirectly by influencing the behavior of voters. In order to structure these general objectives, we will focus the analysis to three main (non-excludable) environments where such goals are be addressed: (i) Sharing rules, (in)equality and group performance in contests; (ii) Environmental regulation and market structure, and (iii) Campaign spending and vote buying.