József's first degree was in Electrical Engineering from the Technical University of Budapest. He continued his studies at Stanford University (California), where he obtained an MSc in Operations Research and a PhD in Business. Following a Postdoc at CentER in Tilburg (Netherlands), he spent nearly a decade at the Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) in Barcelona. Between 2000 and 2021 he worked in the School of Economics of The University of Edinburgh, where he has been Head of Department and Head of School. He was promoted to a Personal Chair (Full Professor) in 2003. His research area is theoretical microeconomics, especially applied game theory or industrial organization, but he has also contributed to consumer theory and has two (families of) game theoretic solution concepts to his name.

Selected publications

Forges, F., & Sákovics, J. (2022) Tenable threats when Nash Equilibrium is the norm. International Journal of Game Theory, forthcoming. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00182-022-00806-3

Bru, Ll., Cardona, D., & Sákovics, J. (2022) Block sourcing plus. European Journal of Operational Research, forthcoming. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S037722172200515X

Che, Y. K., & Sákovics, J. (2021). To trade, or not to trade, that is the question: New roles for incomplete contracts in dynamic settings. Journal of the European Economic Association, 19(3), 1621-1655. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaa035

Burguet, R., & Sákovics, J. (2019). Bidding for talent in sport. Economic Inquiry, 57(1), 85-102. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12712

Burguet, R., & Sákovics, J. (2017). Competitive foreclosure. The RAND Journal of Economics, 48(4), 906-926. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12206

Friedman, D., & Sákovics, J. (2015). Tractable consumer choice. Theory and Decision, 79(2), 333-358. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9461-0

Sákovics, J. (2013). Revealed cardinal preference. Economic Theory Bulletin, 1(1), 39-45. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-013-0006-4

Sákovics, J., & Steiner, J. (2012). Who matters in coordination problems?. American Economic Review, 102(7), 3439-61. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.7.3439

Sákovics, J. (2011). Reference distorted prices. Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 9(4), 339-363. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11129-011-9104-5

Esteban, J., & Sákovics, J. (2008) A Theory of Agreements in the Shadow of Conflict: The Genesis of Bargaining Power. Theory and Decision, 65(3), 227-252. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9093-8

Che, Y-K., & Sákovics, J. (2004) A dynamic theory of holdup. Econometrica, 72(4), 1063-1103. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00526.x

De Fraja, G., & Sákovics, J. (2001). Walras retrouvé: Decentralized trading mechanisms and the competitive price. Journal of Political Economy, 109(4), 842-863. https://doi.org/10.1086/322087

Sákovics, J. (2001). Games of incomplete information without common knowledge priors. Theory and Decision, 50(4), 347-366.
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010325001555

Burguet, R., & Sákovics, J. (1999). Imperfect competition in auction designs. International Economic Review, 40(1), 231-247. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2354.00013